Why corporations must return to investing in venture capital

gas-pump-pricesAmerica’s innovation engine is out of gas. Much has been written about the problem, but no one has addressed the major missing piece: the role of the corporation.

American corporations have been slashing internal long-term research and development spending for decades, and, more recently, investments in venture capital-backed startups. To turn this situation around, they must re-invest aggressively in venture capital and rely far more on leading-edge startups for outside R&D.

Consider, for example, the fall of General Motors. Once the biggest industrial company in the world, it is now the beleaguered ward of the U.S. government. If it had removed its blinders and realized it could no longer pursue a business model based on the now-defunct concept of cheap energy, it might have invested in, say, Tesla Motors, the prominent San Carlos-based maker of all-electric vehicles. Perhaps its fate could have been averted.

There has been a significant and sustained reduction in the role of major U.S. corporations in American innovation for three decades. There was a time when AT&T’s Bell Labs, IBM’s Watson Labs and XEROX PARC were engines of invention and the envy of the developed world.

In 1981, U.S corporations with more than 25,000 employees represented approximately 70 percent of the investment in industrial innovation in the United States, according to the National Science Foundation. By 2006, that figure plummeted to 37 percent.

Fortunately, a new model of U.S. innovation has emerged to pick up the slack. Backed by venture capitalists, and in partnership with major university research centers, the world’s best and brightest engineers and scientists demonstrated that they could out-innovate the legendary corporate labs of the past. These startups proved that risk-oriented entrepreneurs, rewarded commensurately for success, could redefine an economy.

As corporate R&D took a dive, small companies increased their investment in this area from 10 percent of U.S. R&D to almost 40 percent. In fact, public companies that were originally venture capital-backed today represent 17.5 percent of the U.S. GDP and have created more than 12 million high-paying jobs in the last 30 years.

But the majority of corporate investments in venture capital have since declined sharply. Corporations have shied away from VC investing because it’s a long-term commitment and does not mix well with shorter-term corporate planning, nor with Wall Street’s insistence on predictable quarterly earnings.

To be fair, not all corporations have cut back on their venture investing. The most notable exception is Intel — long the corporate icon of corporate venture capital. When Intel fell on hard times late last year, the chip giant responded appropriately by closing older factories and cutting thousands of jobs. Intel Capital, however, made 169 investments totaling $1.6 billion last year, and firm president Arvind Sodhani sees no signs of an impending investment slowdown.

“We continue to do what we’ve always done, which is fostering innovation and entrepreneurship throughout the world,” Sodhani said in a recent interview in Venture Capital Dispatch. “We’re still very active in China, India, parts of Latin America and in Central Europe. We are a persistent and consistent investor.”

This is how market leadership is developed and sustained in a global economy driven by innovation. The problem is that Intel is the exception. Boeing, for example, had investments in 25 venture capital firms worldwide, but then sold its portfolio. AT&T announced a $1 billion fund during the dot-com boom, but later reduced the fund substantially. General Electric’s GE Capital also created a fund during the bubble but eventually bailed.

After a lag, GE announced the creation of another venture fund, but it appears to be in jeopardy once again because GE Capital, the home of the fund, provided nearly half of all of GE’s profits. Today, it’s the source of GE’s greatest losses, and CEO Jeff Immelt recently said his company needed “to get back to basics” and focus more on manufacturing and infrastructure and less on financial services and related areas.

Such capricious investment behavior is highly unfortunate because corporations have customers with expectations of continual, reliable and predictable innovation — expectations that must be met. Corporations simply don’t have the luxury of not being in the business of innovation, and that requires steady and consistent investment.

Unfortunately, corporate interest in venture capital investing has largely followed the ups and downs of the stock market, precisely the opposite of a sage investment approach. Corporate investment in venture capital, for example, skyrocketed during the 1999 and 2000 dot-com bubble. It then plummeted until 2006, largely because of the dot-com bust. Corporate interest bounced back a bit in 2007 when the market saw its best performance in years, but trailed off again in tandem with the market.

This misguided corporate herd mentality is dangerous. Notwithstanding individual circumstances, the fact is that corporations simply must return to the venture game, and the time is now. For all the strength of their brands, distribution networks and extensive customer relationships, their future viability will increasingly rely on the startups of Silicon Valley and their cousins elsewhere. Amid a deep recession and fierce global competition, U.S. corporations are in no position to return to the halcyon era of internal R&D spending. They must rely on partnerships with startups.

Of course, heightened corporate investment in venture capital funds and venture-backed startups will not solve all of America’s technology investment problems. Among other things, there must also be a proactive government effort to attract and retain the world’s best technology talent to work at leading-edge domestic startups.

Yet leveraging the top-flight innovation that is ubiquitous in venture capital circles is the most overlooked opportunity to address the deterioration in American R&D. U.S. corporations must rise to the occasion and help restore the luster of venture capital and America’s technological moxie.

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Photo of Robert R. Ackerman Jr.

About the Author, Robert R. Ackerman Jr.

Robert R. Ackerman, Jr. is the founder and managing director of Allegis Capital, a seed and early-stage venture firm headquartered in Palo Alto. Ackerman has worked with more than 50 corporate investment partners over the past 20 years as both a venture capitalist and a startup executive.

  • Innovator
    This whole thing about Intel continuing to support innovation etc is complete BS. You should talk to entrepreneurs to find the real story, not the people running the fund. Intel is simply following the rest of the crowd. Which is shameful since they don't have the problem of LPs pulling back etc. When you talk to the Intel investment managers, all they say is they have shut down investments in early stage companies. Sadly, that is where the most ground breaking innovations happen. Just like every other VC firm, Intel has moved to investing in later stage firms. Which makes one wonder why and how they deserve special mention.
  • Your point with respect to INTEL is well taken. That said, they do invest around technologies where they are looking to build a new category - view it as a "market development" exercise as much (or perhaps more) as an investment in innovation. I would agree with your point on many vestors moving to later stage investments (or firm is an exception). Part of this is driven by an investor's tolerance for risk (yep - the earlier you go the highter the risk) and/or the long holding period for an exit. The longer the holding period - the lower the rate of return - and that is how investors are measured.

    Early-stage investing tends to be more the domain of the ex-operating executives or highly experience venture investors where through first hand experience the investor can understand the risk and get comfortable managing those risks. Unfortunately - there is a crticial shortage of ex-operating executives in venture and we will probably see a drop in the number of highly experienced venture guys staying in the business in the current environment.
  • Great essay. A few comments:

    "American corporations have been slashing internal long-term research and development spending for decades, "

    Part of the dynamic here is due to a change in the law of patent ownership, and a migration of human capital that resulted. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave universities the right to take title to patents. University tech transfer took off at the same time that early-stage R&D became less economic for large corporations. Yet the transactions costs of technology transfer have plugged some -- but not all -- technology pipelines from universities to corporations. For computer hardware, for example, it may be the case that vertical integration from early-stage R&D through to commercialization is more cost-efficient from a social perspective than negotiating and acquiring the same R&D from VC-backed startups or even university R&D labs (when that's even possible). For drugs, for example, the system seems to have adapted quite well and there are now private equity intermediaries providing future royalty financing to universities for this work.

    When I point these facts out to VCs, the general response is, "Ideas are cheap, it's the team that executes on them that adds all the value." I understand that view, and there is no doubt that good operating teams are hard to come by. But the fact is that not every technology needs 5 years and $50 million in financing to find a home inside an established manufacturing, marketing, and distribution channel. In general, VC money is not well-aligned with keeping a pipeline moving at a steady flow, but rather with swinging for the fences.

    A possible solution is for some VCs to specalize in technology transfer. But until patent rights get stronger and universities get more used to giving up control over patents to inventors (see Stephen Quake editorial here: http://judson.blogs.nytimes.com/author/Stephen-...) and limited partners get more organized and sophisticated in their understanding of how and when early-stage funds will produce decent returns, that solution remains a pipe dream -- or rather, a dream of an unclogged pipe.
  • Great comments... Stanford does a particularly good job on the IP licensing front - It really has become part of their culture. Many University academics place all of the value in the IP when in fact a great idea without a solid team to execute is usually a false start. This is where the Universities can get it wrong - they over state the value of the IP. The same thing can happen with corporations with them look to spinout IP.

    Your comment on VCs and $50M rings familiar. One of the major challenges with over-sized venture funds is that they want to write larger checks because they are managing larger pools of capital. Of course, thie requires largers exits in order to generate returns and we all know how that has wored the last few years. I'm a deep believer in "right-sized" funds - smaller investments in differentiated ideas with discipline around cost and capital efficiency. The model works and you can generate venture rates of return in an M & A enviroment. It just takes a lot of discipline to limit fund size. Hopefully, we are heading into a environment where small is beautiful - and profitable. When it comes to venture fund size - large is the enemy of great...
  • The other terrific source of IP (technologies, capabilities, and facilities) are the federal labs. I think Industry (and VCs) ought to be looking at these open innovation resources as places to validate and enhance in addition to source ideas. In comparison the feds spend about 100B on R&D in their facilities each year and I think the number for US universities is about 20B.

    Also I often quote a CFO magazine study that noted that while 96% of CFO realize that managing their IP (which I think includes innovation) only 5% of them have an active program to do so.
    http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011647?f=search

    If you want to see how this boils down in the corporate suite, look at how an average annual report deals with IP, then go take a look a real IP company like BASF. You will see how you can link R&D to success.
  • Agree DMCFeet. One of the challenges on the Fed side can be identifying the technologies and their sources. Many of the development contracts let by the Fed's require that the resulting technology/code needs to made available in the market place. NASA used to have a program that publicized their projects where resulting codes was available to the "public". Any suggesitons on where parties interested in government sponsored IP should go to identify opportunities? If Universities are tough - the Feds can be positively Byzantine.
  • Matthias
    It seems like the best thing US corporations can do to foster innovation is to (1) buy products from ventures; and (2) buy ventures themselves. That will drive the funding and teams for the next cycle of breakthroughs.

    It's difficult to imagine that those corporations that don't have the long-term vision to invest in their own products have the insight or skills required to invest in fast-moving start-ups. But they can always play catch-up by buying those ventures when the pressure is on -- better for us (entrepreneurs, VCs)!
  • Amen... I met with nVidia today - they are putting together a very nice corporate venture program - check it out. They are still run by a founder/entrepreneur and are driven by innovation.
  • scottwharton
    Great article Bob. It might be a nice follow up article to talk about *how* corporations can employ best practices to be successful investors. I've heard a number of stories of corporate investors that shy away from venture investing because they are so bad at it. Also, many fellow entrepreneurs are suspect of corporate backing due to the sometimes onerous strings attached to the money, locking down a company direction when flexibility might be needed.

    It's clear that many corporations could gain a real advantage by having unique access to the up and coming companies / technologies if they would participate at an earlier stage vs. just waiting for M&A which is much more expensive and less conducing to learning about emerging markets before they actually happen.

    Scott
  • Thanks Scott. A number of years ago I developed a model for corporate venture investing that sought to reconcile the nature of venture capital with the constraints/skills of corporate investors. Essentially, i was looking to develop a model for sustainable corporate venture investing that reconciled a corporation's tolerance for risk and valuation volatility, with capital deployment, strategic value and stage of investment. I turned this into an article last week which I would be happy to post if I can figure out how to get it posted here.

    Bob
  • Hi Bob. Can you point me to the source data for this comment: "Unfortunately, corporate interest in venture capital investing has largely followed the ups and downs of the stock market, precisely the opposite of a sage investment approach. Corporate investment in venture capital, for example, skyrocketed during the 1999 and 2000 dot-com bubble. It then plummeted until 2006, largely because of the dot-com bust. Corporate interest bounced back a bit in 2007 when the market saw its best performance in years, but trailed off again in tandem with the market."
    Much appreciated. Regards Paul.
  • Paul - if you go to the NVCA website - you should be able to pull up data on the ebbs and flows of capital into venture over the years. There is some time a breakout there that shows the corporate numbers. What is clearl from all of the data that I have reviewed over the years (plus my own experience with corporate investors) is that when the markets correct/sell-off, the corporate investors - by and large - pull back from the market. Much of this is driven by the inherent conflict between a corporation's need for quarterly reporting (and predictability) and the volatility associated with market corrections. When bull markets are running fast - many investors - including corporate investors - tend to jump in the market. When markets correct - they exit. Exacly the opposite of what a sage investor might be expected to do.
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