Can you trust any VCs under 40?

(Editor’s note: Serial entrepreneur Steve Blank is the author of Four Steps to the Epiphany. This column originally appeared on his blog.)

Over the last 30 years Wall Street’s appetite for technology stocks have changed radically – swinging between unbridled enthusiasm to believing they’re all toxic. Over the same 30 years, Venture Capital firms have honed their skills and strategies to match Wall Streets needs to achieve liquidity for their portfolio companies.kid-in-suit

You have to wonder: does the VC you have on your board today have the right skill set to help you succeed in today’s economic environment?

One of the biggest mistakes entrepreneurs make is misunderstanding the role of venture capital investors. There’s lots of lore, emotion, and misconceptions of what VC’s do or don’t do for entrepreneurs. The reality is that VC’s have one goal to maximize the amount of money they return to their investors. To do this they have to accomplish five things:

1) Get deal flow – via networking and legwork, they identify likely industries, companies and teams with the potential for rapid growth (less than 10 years),

2) Evaluate those companies and teams on the basis of technology, market opportunity, and team.  (Each VC firm/partner has a different spin on what to weigh more.)

3) Invest in and take equity stakes in exchange for capital.

4) Help nurture and grow the companies they invest in.

5) Liquidate their investment in each company at the highest possible price.

VC’s make money by selling their share of your company to some other buyer – hopefully at a large multiple over what they originally paid for it. From 1979, when pensions funds began fueling the expansion of venture capital, the way VCs sold their portion of your company was to help you take your company “public.” Your firm worked with an investment banking firm that underwrote and offered stock (typically on the NASDAQ exchange) to the public. At this Initial Public Offering your company raised money for its use in expanding the business.

In theory when you went public, everyone’s shares were now tradable on the stock exchange, but usually the underwriters required a six-month “lockup” preventing company insiders (employees and investors) from selling. After the end of the lockup, venture firms sold off their stock in an orderly fashion, and entrepreneurs sold theirs and bought new cars and houses.

Five Quarters of Profitability

During the 1980’s and through the mid 1990’s startups going public had to do something that most companies today never heard of – they had to show a track record of increasing revenue and consistent profitability. Underwriters who would offer the stock to the public typically asked for a young company to show five consecutive quarters of profits.

There was no law that said that a company had to, but most underwriters wouldn’t take a company public without it. (On top of all this it was considered very bad form not to have at least four additional consecutive quarters of profits after an IPO.)  While there was an occasional bad apple, the public markets rewarded companies with revenue growth and sustainable profits.

What this meant for entrepreneurs and VC’s was simple and profound – and is entirely unappreciated today: VC’s worked with entrepreneurs to build profitable and scalable businesses. In this time, a successful business was one that had paying customers quarter after quarter, not one that was flipped or hyped to the market despite a lack of earnings or revenue.

Venture Capitalists on the board brought a firm their expertise to build long-term sustainable companies. They taught companies about customers, markets and profits.

The world of building profitable startups as the primary goal of Venture Capital would end in 1995.

The IPO Bubble – August 1995 – March 2000

In August 1995 Netscape went public, and the world of start ups turned upside down. On its first day of trading, Netscape stock closed at $58/share, valuing the company at $2.7 billion for a company with less than $50 million in sales. (Yahoo would hit $104/share in March 2000 with a market cap of $104 billion.) There was now a public market for companies with no revenue, no profit and big claims.

Underwriters realized that as long as the public was happy snapping up shares, they could make huge profits on the inflated valuations – regardless of whether or not the company should have ever been public.

Some companies didn’t even have to go public to get liquid. Tech acquisitions went crazy at the same time the IPO market did. Large companies were buying startups just to get in the game at the same absurd prices.

What this meant for entrepreneurs and VC’s was simple– the gold rush to liquidity was on. The old rules of building companies with sustainable revenue and consistent profitability went out the window. VCs worked with entrepreneurs to brand, hype and take public unprofitable companies with grand promises of the future. The goals were “first mover advantage,” “grab market share” and “get big fast.” VCs or entrepreneurs who talked about building profitable businesses were told, “You just don’t get the new rules.”

To be honest, for four years, these were the new rules. Entrepreneurs and VCs made returns 10x, or even 100x larger than anything ever seen. (No value judgments here, VCs were doing what the market rewarded them for, and their investors expected – maximum returns.)

And since Venture Capital looked like anyone could do it, the number of venture firms soared as fast as stock prices.

Venture Capitalists on boards developed the expertise to get a firm public as soon as possible using whatever it took including hype and spin – because the sooner a company got its billion dollar market cap, the sooner the VC firm could sell their shares and distribute their profits.

The boom in Internet startups would last 4.5 years – until it came crashing down to earth in March 2000.

The Rise of Mergers and Acquisitions -– March 2003 -2008

After the dot.com bubble collapsed, the IPO market (and most tech M&A deals) shut down for technology companies. Venture investors spent the next three years doing triage, sorting through the rubble to find companies that weren’t bleeding cash and could actually be turned into businesses. With Wall Street leery of technology companies, tech IPOs were a receding memory, and mergers and acquisitions became the only path to liquidity for startups and their investors. For the next four or five years, technology M&A boomed, growing from 50 buyouts in 2003 to 450 in 2006.

What this meant for entrepreneurs and VCs was a bit more complex– the IPO market was all but closed (with the Google IPO in 2004 as a brilliant exception), but it was possible find a buyer for your company. The valuations for acquisitions were nothing like the Internet bubble, but there was a path to liquidity, difficult as it was. (Every startup wanted to believe they could get acquired like YouTube for $1.4 billion.)

VCs worked with entrepreneurs to build their company with an eye out for a chance to flip it to an acquirer. The formula for exits was a variation of the formula they used in the Internet bubble, morphing into: brand, hype and sell the company.

In the Fall of 2008, the credit crisis wiped out mergers and acquisitions as a path to liquidity as M&A collapsed with the rest of the market.

So what’s left?

2009 – Back to The Future

The bad news is that since the bubble, most VC firms haven’t made a profit. It may just be that the message of building companies that have predictable revenue and profit models hasn’t percolated through the VC business model. (Perhaps in direct proportion to the number of “freemium” and “eyeballs” web deals funded.)

It may be that the venture business will have to return to the old days of helping entrepreneurs build companies – not hype them, not spin them, but actually make them worth something to customers and investors.

The question is: Do VC’s still have what it takes to do so?

Next time you sit in a board meeting with your VCs, step back a bit from the moment and listen to their advice – like you are hearing them for the first time. Are these VC’s who know how to build a company?  Is the advice they are giving you going to help you build a repeatable and scalable revenue model that’s profitable quarter after quarter?

Or were they trained and raised in the bubble and M&A hype and still looking for some shortcut to liquidity?

Image by Stephen K. Willi via Flickr.

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About the Author, Steve Blank

Steve Blank is a retired serial entrepreneur and has been a founder or participant in eight Silicon Valley startups since 1978. After he retired, he wrote a book about building early stage companies: Four Steps to the Epiphany. He's moved from being an entrepreneur to teaching entrepreneurship to both undergraduate and graduate students at U.C. Berkeley, Stanford University and the Columbia University/Berkeley Joint Executive MBA program. The “Customer Development” model that he developed in his book is one of the core themes for these classes. In 2009 he was awarded the Stanford University Undergraduate Teaching Award in the department of Management Science and Engineering.

  • cfk906
    I find it interesting that you chose the age range in your title "VCs under 40" as the bracket to pick on. For starters, have you noticed the age of the Founders at Google, Yahoo, Facebook, MySpace, Brightcove, etc.... It's fairly hard to generalize that age has a lot to do with building innovative companies. Obviously, I just referred to Founders (and CEO's) rather than VCs, but roll with me for a second.

    Most VCs "make Partner" (if they're going to) in their early/mid 30's. For illustrative purposes, let's say 33; which is probably on the younger side, but I'll be generous to your case (because choosing an older age only makes your title look worse). In thinking about the bubble, which started in the mid 90's, let's say 1996 for the heck of it. That would mean that people who became partners between 1996 and 2000 are now 42 to 46. Wow, wait, that's "over 40." So are you suggesting that these VCs, who made "easy money" in the 90's and coasted in the mid 00's are the ones you want on your board? If so, good luck

    Considering that there are few VCs older than 50 in the market and few that actually can relate to young CEOs and understand new age media (Facebook, YouTube, etc), then you're really only left with the fact that the best VCs are probably those "UNDER THE AGE OF 40" who have actually only learned to build real companies. Those under 40 have now dealt with two economic collapses and know that only quality businesses survive.
  • aduwanda
    I agree with your arguments, but disagree with your headline... there wasn't anything in the body of your text connected to age, except a mathematical exercise that a person under 40 couldn't have been an active VC in the 1980s... I think the right question to ask is, during what era did the VC learn their craft?... those that rose to fame and fortune during the bubble still cling to the old notions that finding "heat" is the way to achieve returns... there are plenty of young VCs who cut their teeth in the 2000s that know that solid scalable business models are the only route to success... maybe the headline should say "Don't trust a middle aged VC"
  • Boz
    That's an interesting article. As someone who is in the process of raising capital for the further development of a very profitable web-based business concept, I'm glad I read this at this stage prior to VC interest. I lived through the bubble and thought things were pretty stupid then, but hadn't thought about the skill sets of VC's like that.

    The advisor I'm working with is very old school and is making me work through the business plan carefully. His thinking is that my business model has to show investors that they can get good returns fairly quickly. My guess is that he's in his mid-60's, but he's successfully brought many businesses through capital raising to date, which is why I'm working with him.

    Thanks for the article - I'll keep it in mind when I finally get to meet some VC's.
  • Mimi
    Thanks for the article, good read. I think many entrepreneurs also struggle with outsourcing, delegating, and hiring help...I

    I'd like to share a recent busienss documentary featuring today sucessful entrepreneurs ''The YES Movie''www.TheYESmovie.comby Louis Lautman
  • pgomory
    Steve - indeed a great read (we met back in Wegbreit/Ardent days). In recruiting CEOs and VPs to VC-backed companies since 1980, I've seen parallel phenomena in candidates (builders vs. flippers) and in board members (who in the bubble could be more impressed by "heat"-type personalities than by candidates of proven substance). I look forward to your future posts.
  • Name
    This article seems to assume the entrepreneurs are / were not accomplices in this Get-Rich-Quick mindset.
  • We are living in an age of Entrpreneurial Counter Culture

    http://siliconangle.net/ver2/2009/09/18/an-entr...
  • AnonymousCoward
    Isn't there a counter-argument, that if the VC on your board built their last company ten or more years ago they won't really not in a position to help you with introductions and contacts in the operations side of the business? Fellow VCs yes, journalists yes, but helping you get hooked in to supply chains/synergistic established companies/etc?

    Do you think there is value in having a board member VC who recently made partner, being more "hungry" for a big win? Or is this drive just a characteristic of certain VCs, regardless of their age?
  • cloudwhale
    More than an argument about trusting VCs under 40, I think this is a great synopsis of how VC funding and exits happened over the past 15 years and about how their agendas are different from those of an entrepreneur.

    Also, I doubt if it would be fair to generalize VCs by age. It would be better to look at it as 'Can you trust the new generation of VCs of the digital age?'
  • Whatever age of the VC, companies need to make revenue and profit.
    As long there are people willing to invest in companies aiming for market leadership without a decent business model these strange deals will continue to exist.

    VC's do evaluate and question the start-up company and the business and the management and the products, but entrepreneurs shoudl take time to question and investigate the VC too. What does a VC bring to the table besides money and noise?